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I. INTRODUCTION
After a high school party in Minnesota, several partygoers “posted” pictures from
their night onto the popular social networking site Facebook, which made the
pictures available for public viewing.1 Officials from Eden Prairie High School
discovered the pictures, many of which contained underage drinking, and suspended
over 100 students based on the pictures’ contents. 2 This story starkly demonstrates
the phenomenon that while many students are aware of the potential risks associated
with posting information on social networking sites, 3 the risks have done little to
deter students from using these sites. 4 Thus, public schools are increasingly required
to evaluate the bounds of their authority in disciplining students for their activities
on the Internet.
Despite this need for constant evaluation, the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance to public schools on the issue of what student Internet speech may be
regulated without infringing upon the students’ First Amendment rights. While the
lack of Supreme Court guidance has undoubtedly caused confusion among public
schools, a greater amount of uncertainty surrounding this issue exists in the lower
courts. The Third Circuit’s decisions in Layshock v. Hermitage School District5 and
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District,6 handed down on the same day, poignantly
illustrate this area’s unsettled nature. Both cases involve public school students who
received extended suspensions7 after they created offensive MySpace pages of their
respective principals.8 Both students sued their school districts, alleging that their
suspensions violated their First Amendment right of free speech. 9 Despite the nearly

1

See Mary Lynn Smith & Courtney Blanchard, Facebook Photos Land Eden Prairie
Kids in Trouble, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Jan. 9, 2008, at 1B, available at 2008
WLNR 883534.
2

Id.

3 One Eden Prairie student stated that “[i]t’s dumb to have these pictures up on the
Internet,” because of the potential consequences they create. Id. Another stated that she does
not “put bad stuff on [her] page,” because of the risks associated with them. Id. By posting
pictures of illegal activities or comments containing offensive or harassing language on the
Internet, students risk the possibility of suspensions, see, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), or even criminal charges, see Rob Quinn,
Teens Arrested Over Facebook Prank, NEWSER (Jan. 14, 2011, 10:26 AM),
http://www.newser.com/story/109697/teens-arrested-over-facebook-prank.html.
4 See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Nov. 15,
2011) (estimating that Facebook has over 800 million active users).
5

Layshock, 593 F.3d 249.

6

J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010).

7 Layshock, 593 F.3d at 254; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 293 (stating that both students received
ten day out-of-school suspensions).
8

See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 252-53; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291.

9 Layshock, 593 F.3d at 245-55; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 294-95. For background information
on the First Amendment, see generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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identical facts of each case, the Third Circuit reached opposite conclusions regarding
the students’ First Amendment rights. 10
The conflicting results of these cases indicate that a clarification of current
precedent is necessary to integrate Internet-originated speech. Under the current
precedent established in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,11 a student’s right of free speech may be regulated only if the speech 1)
originates on school grounds and 2) would substantially disrupt school operations or
interfere with the rights of others. 12 However, this standard cannot adequately
encompass situations that arise in today’s Internet-centered world because a great
deal of Internet-originated speech does not occur “on-campus” and courts are unsure
of what exactly constitutes a “substantial disruption” as required by Tinker.13
First, Tinker and its progeny14 involved actions by students that occurred directly
on school grounds, such as silent protests in the classrooms or speeches given in the
school’s auditorium.15 Although courts routinely emphasize that student speech can
only be regulated if it occurs “on-campus,” such a requirement has become virtually
meaningless considering that the nature of the Internet makes it both “nowhere and
everywhere at the same time . . . .”16 Given the Internet’s imperceptible existence,
Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement creates a confusing and illogical requisite.
Furthermore, because students may access the Internet from school computers, as
well as their own computers and cell phones brought into the school, Tinker creates a
strange disciplinary system allowing First Amendment protections only when
Internet speech is said outside of school boundaries, despite the speech occurring
over the same medium. Consider the following example. One student uses her cell
phone while walking out of the school doors at the end of the school day to post a
harassing comment about a teacher that is later discovered. At the same time,
another student uses his cell phone inside the school, posts the same kind of
comment, which is also later discovered. Under Tinker’s current understanding, the
first student’s comments are protected by the First Amendment, while the second
Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263 (holding that Layshock’s suspension violated his right of free
speech); Snyder, 593 F.3d at 303 (holding that Snyder’s suspension did not violate her right of
free speech).
10

11

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

12

Id. at 513.

13 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (stating that “[t]here is some
uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech precedents . .
. .”) (citation omitted); Benjamin T. Bradford, Comment, Is It Really MySpace? Our
Disjointed History of Public School Discipline for Student Speech Needs a New Test for an
Online Era, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 323, 331 (2010) (arguing that “when the tests outlined in
[Tinker and its progeny] are extended to student speech occurring at places and times when
the students are no longer under school supervision, the logic behind each of the tests begins
to crack, if not completely crumble.”).
14 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (1986). For an in-depth discussion of both Morse and Fraser, see infra Part II.B-D.
15

See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.

16 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV.
1027, 1090 (2008).
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student is subject to disciplinary action by the school. 17 Recognizing this absurdity,
courts themselves understand that the “on-campus” requirement is becoming
increasingly meaningless: “[a]s technology allows such access, it requires school
administrators to be more concerned about speech created off campus—which
almost inevitably leaks onto campus—than they would have in years past.”18
Therefore, because the current Tinker standard does not adequately take into account
speech that occurs on the Internet, a re-examination of this standard is necessary.
Second, courts are unsure of what exactly constitutes a “substantial disruption”
under Tinker. In both Snyder and Layshock, the respective school districts argued
that a substantial disruption occurred since students circulated copies of the parodied
MySpace profiles and discussed the profiles’ contents during class time, requiring
administrators and teachers to repeatedly ask students to refrain from discussing the
profiles at school.19 While the Snyder court found this to be “substantially
disruptive” under Tinker,20 the Layshock court did not.21 It is clear from Snyder and
Layshock that courts are confused about the intersection of student free speech
precedent and the widespread use of the Internet. Thus, a clarification of this
standard would not only inform students of their rights on the Internet, but would
also guide public schools in determining the limits of their disciplinary reach.
This Note argues that the Tinker standard needs to be reevaluated to encompass
Internet-related cases both by eliminating the “on-campus” requirement and by
further defining what constitutes a “substantial disruption.” The “on-campus”
requirement should be eliminated for the following reasons: 1) lower federal courts
already disregard this condition for Internet-related cases; 2) it leads students to
abuse their First Amendment rights; and 3) this requirement threatens the safety of
teachers, students, and other school personnel. Additionally, Tinker’s “substantial
disruption” prong would be better understood as a factors test. This ensures that
schools utilize the same criteria in determining whether a “substantial disruption”
has occurred, as well as eliminate the need for courts to define ambiguous terms.
Part II examines the evolution of Supreme Court student speech cases beginning
with Tinker in 1969 until its most recent decision in 2007: Morse v. Frederick.22 Part
III proceeds by arguing that Tinker would be more applicable to present-day student
speech cases if its “on-campus” requirement was eliminated. Part IV further argues
that a clarification of Tinker’s “substantial disruption” requirement is necessary both
to avoid conflicting results on identical facts 23 and to ensure that courts use the same
criteria to determine whether a “substantial disruption” had occurred. Implementing

17

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.

18

Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *7 n.5 (M.D.
Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).
19 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir.
2010); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2010).
20

Snyder, 593 F.3d at 302.

21

See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 258-59 (acknowledging that the school district could not
satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test).
22

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).

23

See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 293-94.
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these revisions would ensure that the Tinker standard is better adapted to Internetrelated cases.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TINKER STANDARD
This Part discusses the evolution of Supreme Court precedent in the area of
student free speech rights. The general standard for student speech was first
articulated in 1969, when the Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines. The Court has
since decided three subsequent student speech cases and has offered a new rationale
for speech regulation in each case.24 In addition to the confusion caused by these
four rationales, the Court neglected to expand on the specific situations in which
each standard potentially applies. Thus, as a result of these four cases, lower courts
are left to determine which standard, out of the four possible, is germane to a given
fact pattern with little guidance from the Supreme Court. As such, this Part attempts
to distinguish the four Supreme Court cases and determine the situations under
which each standard applies. It will ultimately conclude that Tinker is the
appropriate standard to use for Internet-related cases.
A. The Beginning of Student Free Speech Regulation—Tinker v. Des Moines
The United States Supreme Court had its first opportunity to define the limits of
student free speech on public school premises in Tinker v. Des Moines. There, a
group of high school students desired to voice their opposition to the Vietnam War
by wearing black armbands to school.25 Several days before the scheduled protest,
the school adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would
either be asked to remove it or suspended.26 Despite this policy, three students
continued with the protest and wore the black armbands to school and, as a result, all
three were suspended.27 The students sued the school district, challenging the
constitutionality of their suspensions. 28
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that neither teachers nor students
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”29
However, students’ First Amendment rights must be
determined by looking at the “special characteristics of the school environment.” 30
Thus, students, while they are on school premises, are not necessarily afforded the
same First Amendment rights as adults.31
24

See infra Part II.B-D.

25

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 506.

30 Id. See also id. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that, “[a] State may . . .
determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive
audience -is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.”).
31 See id. at 506 (stating that the rights of students must be “applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment . . . .”).
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The Court concluded that, despite the limited First Amendment rights given to
students, public schools are not free to regulate any speech deemed to be
unpleasant.32 Schools cannot punish students for a particular expression of opinion
out of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.” 33 Thus, to uphold a student’s punishment,
the school must show that the conduct would “materially disrupt[] classwork or
involve[] substantial disorder or inva[de] . . . the rights of others . . . .” 34 Because
the school did not present any evidence that the students’ protest either interrupted
school activities or intruded upon the rights of others, the Court held that their
suspensions violated their Constitutional rights.35
B. Expanding Speech Restrictions—Bethel School District v. Fraser
Seventeen years after Tinker, the Court re-examined the bounds of student free
speech in Bethel School District v. Fraser.36 In Fraser, a high school student
delivered a sexually explicit speech nominating one of his fellow classmates for
student elective office during a school assembly. 37 Fraser delivered the speech
despite prior warnings given to him by several teachers regarding the potential
punishments of delivering the speech.38 After characterizing Fraser’s speech as
“indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty and decency of many of the students
and faculty in attendance at the assembly,” the school suspended Fraser for three
days.39 Fraser then sued the school district challenging the constitutionality of his
suspension.40
The Court began its analysis with an examination of public schools’ role in
society.41 The objective of public education is to instill the “fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system” in its students. 42
These fundamental values must teach students to balance an advocacy for unpopular
and controversial viewpoints with the knowledge of the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.43 Based on these values, the Fraser Court, following Tinker’s
guidance, acknowledged that “the constitutional rights of students in public school[s]
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” 44 For
32

See id. at 509.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 513.

35

Id. at 514.

36

Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

37

Id. at 677.

38

Id. at 677-78.

39

Id. at 678-79.

40

Id. at 679.

41

Id. at 681.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id. at 682.
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this reason, “[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”45 This duty
is exclusively given to the schools because it is through the conduct of teachers and
older students that the remainder of the student body understands the appropriate
form of civil disclosure and expression. 46
Against this backdrop, the Court held that a student’s right of free speech does
not extend to “vulgar and lewd” speech; so the school district was within its
authority to discipline Fraser.47 This holding is an exception to Tinker because the
school does not have to anticipate a disruption of class time or an interference with
the rights of others.48 Instead, the vulgar and offensive nature of the speech itself is
sufficient to satisfy the Fraser standard.49 As such, Fraser creates a two-pronged
analytical framework. If the student speech is vulgar, then the school is free to
discipline the student speaker, regardless of the speech’s disruptive nature.
Conversely, if speech is not vulgar, Tinker remains the applicable authority.
C. Further Expansion of Tinker—Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court again addressed the contours of a
student’s right to free speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.50
Kuhlmeier involved several students who wrote and edited the school newspaper. 51
The newspaper printed more than 4,500 copies throughout the year and was
distributed every three weeks to students, school personnel, and other members of
the community.52
The paper’s final edition included two controversial articles: one relating several
students’ experience with teen pregnancy and another discussing the impact of
divorce on one student and her family. 53 Before approving the edition, the principal
concluded that, despite the authors’ best efforts, the students interviewed for the teen
pregnancy article would not remain anonymous and that the article on divorce would
not be a fair representation of both parents involved. 54 As a result, the principal
determined that his only option was to eliminate the two controversial articles. 55 The

45

Id. at 683 (emphasis added).

46

Id.

47

Id. at 685.

See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (stating that “Fraser established that
the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute” because the Court did not conduct a
“substantial disruption” analysis).
48

49

See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.

50

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

51

Id. at 262.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 263.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 264.
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students saw this deletion as a violation of their First Amendment rights and sued the
school district.56
Similar to the previous cases, the Kuhlmeier Court began by recognizing that
public schools are not akin to other traditional forums that are used “for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”57 Therefore, the rights afforded to students in public schools are not
coextensive with the rights of adults in traditional circumstances. 58 Although the
Kuhlmeier Court began its analysis in a similar manner as both Tinker and Fraser, it
distinguished itself from both cases and ultimately created a new standard under
which student speech may be regulated.
First, the Court stated that “the question . . . addressed in Tinker . . . is different
from the question” addressed in Kulhmeier, which determined “whether the First
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”59
Accordingly, the Kulhmeier Court concluded that “the standard articulated in Tinker
for determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the
standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to
the dissemination of student expression.” 60 Therefore, the Tinker standard was not
applicable in Kuhlmeier.
Second, the Kuhlmeier Court stated that “school[s] must be able to take into
account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to
disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive topics . . . .” 61 This takes
Kuhlmeier out of the realm of the lewd and vulgar speech standard articulated in
Fraser and instead puts it in a new category of sensitive student speech. Thus, the
standard articulated in Kuhlmeier allows a school to exercise “editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”62
Therefore, the students’ First Amendment rights were not violated when the
principal deleted the two controversial articles. 63
D. The Final Clarification of Student Speech Restriction—Morse v. Frederick
The Supreme Court’s most recent examination of student speech rights came in
2007 when the Court decided Morse v. Frederick. Morse involved a high school
student who, in an attempt to get on television at a school-sanctioned, schoolsponsored event, unfurled a large banner that indiscreetly advocated illegal drug
use.64 The student was told to take down the banner and, upon his refusal, was
56

Id.

57

Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 469, 515 (1939)).

58

Id. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) & Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
59

Id. at 270-71.

60

Id. at 272-73 (emphasis added).

61

Id. at 272.

62

Id. at 273.

63

Id.

64

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007).
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suspended for ten days.65 Frederick sued the school district, alleging that his
suspension violated his First Amendment right of free speech.66
The Morse Court distinguished its facts from both Tinker and Fraser, ultimately
concluding that neither standard was applicable.67 Although Tinker warned that
schools cannot punish students out of an “‘undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
[a] disturbance’ or ‘a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint,’” the type of speech involved in
Morse was much more serious.68 A public school’s concern for drug abuse
prevention extends well beyond a mere desire to avoid and discomfort and
unpleasantness of a student’s particular viewpoint, 69 thus removing this case from a
Tinker analysis. Furthermore, although the school district urged the Court to adopt a
broader reading of Fraser to include Frederick’s drug reference as “offensive”
speech, such an expansion would allow the standard to encompass virtually all
speech, as “much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to
some.”70
Avoiding the Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier standards, the Morse Court upheld
Frederick’s suspension by reflecting on the dangerous intersection between schools
and drugs.71 The Court noted that nearly half of American high school students have
used an illicit drug upon their graduation and 25% of all high school students have
been “offered, sold, or given an illegal drug on school property within the past
year.”72 Furthermore, “Congress has declared that part of a school’s job is educating
students about the dangers of illegal drug use” and has provided schools with
billions of dollars to support drug-prevention programs.73 As such, the Morse Court
determined that “[t]he First Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at
school events student expression that contributes” to the dangers presented by
drugs.74 Thus, “a public school may prohibit speech advocating illegal drug use.” 75
While the Morse standard seems limited and exclusive to drug use alone, its
analysis opens an avenue that could allow for its application in a variety of student
free speech cases.76 The Morse Court did not use an elemental approach, as the
65

Id. at 396, 398.

66

Id. at 399.

67

Id. at 408-09.

68

Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09
(1969)).
69

See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408-09.

70

Id. at 409.

71

Id. at 407-08.

72

Id. at 407 (citation omitted).

73

Id. at 408.

74

Id. at 410.

75

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).

76 But cf. id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (limiting Morse’s holding to student speech that
reasonably advocates illegal drug use).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011

9

782

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:783

Tinker Court did,77 but instead appealed to the governmental interest behind drugabuse prevention to find that such speech cannot be tolerated in schools. 78 Thus, it is
possible that other forms of student speech may be regulated under the Morse
analysis based on the importance of a prevailing governmental interest. However,
absent further clarification from the Supreme Court, prevailing governmental
interests only serve as an exception to Tinker’s general standard.
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to address student Internet speech when it
decided Morse in 2007. Instead, the Morse Court created a new rationale for
regulating student speech without clarifying previous Supreme Court standards.
Therefore, although lower courts continue to use Tinker as the default authority for
Internet-related cases,79 Morse’s silence on Internet speech has left both schools and
courts with a muddled and confusing doctrine. 80 As such, lower courts are left to
decipher the four student speech standards with minimal guidance and clarification
from the Supreme Court. In light of this confusion, the Supreme Court needs to reexamine the Tinker standard and 1) eliminate the “on-campus” requirement to
incorporate Internet speech and 2) further clarify what constitutes a “substantial
disruption.”
III. TINKER’S “ON-CAMPUS” REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE ELIMINATED
To better adapt Tinker’s standard for student speech restriction to the Internet era,
its “on-campus” requirement should be eliminated. Central to this argument is an
appreciation for the dependence students now have on the Internet. 81 Because the
Internet is another medium of communication for students, many conversations that
would have once been private are now available for viewing by a large public
audience. Furthermore, public schools are in the difficult position of encouraging
student Internet use during structured class time on the one hand and discouraging
personal Internet use during that time on the other hand. 82 Using these competing
77

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(establishing a 2-prong analysis in student speech cases).
78 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (stating that “the governmental interest in stopping student
drug abuse,” reflected in both congressional and school policies, “allow[s] schools to restrict
student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”).
79

See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“[T]he standard for reviewing the suppression of vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive
speech is governed by Fraser, school-sponsored speech by Hazelwood, and all other speech
by Tinker.”) (internal citations omitted). Although these standards do not explicitly mention
Internet-originated speech, courts have regularly applied the Tinker standard for such cases.
See, e.g., Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 298 (3d Cir. 2010); Mahaffey ex
rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Beussink ex rel.
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998). While it
can be argued that Fraser’s standard for lewd and vulgar speech is more appropriate for
Internet speech, this argument is not addressed in this Note. Rather, this Note proceeds by
using Tinker as the general standard for student speech cases because of its continued
application.
80 Benjamin F. Heidlage, Note, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of Youth
Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 579 (2009).
81

See infra Part III.A.

82

See infra Part III.B.
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interests as background, this Part will then argue for the elimination of Tinker’s “oncampus” requirement.
A. The Internet’s Influence on Students
To understand why Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement should be eliminated, it is
first necessary to appreciate the impact that the Internet has on the lives of most
modern students. For students, the Internet is not a detached “virtual world” from
which they can log on and off at-will; instead, it represents a means of
communication that is an integral part of their lives.83 Unlike many adults who
approach their Internet communications as separate from the rest of their actions,
“most youths, having grown up with such technology, have completely integrated
the Internet into their everyday interactions.”84 As a result, “for children, there is no
such dichotomy of online and off-line, or virtual and real—the digital is so much
intertwined into their lives and psyche that the one is entirely enmeshed with the
other.”85 Thus, “[t]here is no real separation between the way youths approach
interactions through traditional methods of communication (including face-to-face)
and those that occur through Internet technology.” 86
The rise in popularity of social networking sites such as Facebook have
contributed to this changing method of youth interaction. Although many adults see
social networking sites as a means of communication with friends and family,
students utilize these sites as replacements for “offline social hangouts.” 87
“[T]eenagers [now] hang out on the Internet and their mobile phones just like ‘they
used to hang out on street corners before.’” 88 As a consequence, many conversations
that would have typically been private between the involved individuals are now
posted online to be viewed by virtually limitless amounts of people.89
Consider the following example. Student complaints about teachers and faculty
members are certainly not a new phenomenon in public schools. 90 However, the rise
in popularity of the Internet has allowed a greater amount of people to see these once
private communications, including parents, teachers, and school administrators. 91 In
See Heidlage, supra note 80, at 588 (“Youths do not merely approach the Internet as a
realm that is separate and distinct from the rest of their lives.”).
83

84

Id.

85

Id. at 588-89 (quoting ANGELA THOMAS, YOUTH ONLINE: IDENTITY AND LITERACY IN
DIGITAL AGE 163 (2007)); see also id. at 580 (“Childrens’ lives in online communities
connect to and blend into their lives in offline communities: socially, emotionally, sometimes
physically, and intellectually.”).
THE

86

Heidlage, supra note 80, at 589.

87

Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027,
1033-34 (2008).
88

Id. at 1034 (internal quotation omitted).

89 See id. at 1036-37; Heidlage, supra note 80, at 589 (“What once would have been a
message passed from one person to another is now an Internet posting available to a
worldwide audience.”).
90

Papandrea, supra note 87, at 1037.

91

Id.
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Wisniewski v. Board of Education,92 an eighth grade student expressed his
dissatisfaction with one of his teachers by creating an “icon”93 of his teacher on an
online instant messaging service.94 Wisniewski’s icon “was a small drawing of a
pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which were dots representing
splattered blood.
Beneath the drawing appeared the words, ‘Kill Mr.
VanderMolen.’”95 Although Wisniewski saw this as merely a joke, the school took
his icon seriously and suspended him for threatening a teacher. 96
As Wisniewski illustrates, student Internet speech typically amplifies what would
ordinarily be said within the context of a face-to-face conversation. Likely, if
Wisniewski had simply complained to his friend about his teacher outside of class,
the school would have no justifiable cause to suspend him. 97 However, because he
supplemented his complaints with a threatening icon, viewable for three weeks and
seen by many of his classmates, it was eventually brought to the school’s attention
and he was suspended.98
Like Wisniewski, many middle- and high school students perceive little, if any,
risk in making outrageous and threatening comments online because of the perceived
anonymity and impunity that the Internet provides. 99 “Thus, [students] proceed in

92

Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).

93

The AOL instant messaging (IM) service

permits the sender of IM messages to display on the computer screen an icon, created
by the sender, which serves as an identifier of the sender, in addition to the sender’s
name. The IM icon of the sender and that of the person replying remain on the screen
during the exchange of text messages between the two “buddies,” and each can copy
the icon of the other and transmit it to any other “buddy” during an IM exchange.
Id. at 35-36.
94

Id. at 35.

95

Id. at 36.

96

Id. at 36-37.

97 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (acknowledging that the First
Amendment gives students the right to “wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket,”
which stated “Fuck the Draft”); Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that, “[i]f [Fraser]
had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been
penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.”)
(citation omitted).
98

Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.

99 Jay Braiman, Note, A New Case, An Old Problem, A Teacher’s Perspective, 74 BROOK.
L. REV. 439, 471 (2009). See, e.g., Donovan v. Richie, 68 F.3d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1995)
(students created a website entitled “The Shit List” which “zeroed in on some 140 named
students, each name being followed by one or more lines of crude descriptions of character
and/or behavior . . . [which] were not merely insulting as to appearance, but suggestive, often
explicitly so, of sexual capacity, proclivity, and promiscuity.”); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v.
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (student created a website entitled
“Satan’s web page” which included “SATAN’S MISSION FOR YOU THIS WEEK: Stab
someone for no reason then set them on fire throw them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and
with their last breath, just before everything goes black, spit on their face.”); J.S. ex rel. H.S.
& I.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (the student-
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disseminating their thoughts to anyone and everyone with a connection to this
seemingly limitless forum for intellectual and linguistic detritus.”100 Since both
courts and schools are unsure of how far a student’s right of free speech extends,
students continue to push the boundaries and gain control of the classroom. 101
B. The Difficulties Schools Face in Enforcing Limits on the Internet
The freedom and invincibility students often feel while communicating online
certainly places public schools in a difficult position. On one hand, public schools
encourage student Internet use by providing on-campus computer labs equipped with
the Internet, requiring research to be done online, and by instructing students on how
to use the Internet. By encouraging student Internet use, schools hope to ensure that
students both have access to technology and an understanding of how to
appropriately use it.102
To further encourage students’ technological proficiency, schools across the
country are changing the face of classroom note-taking by providing students with
in-class computers and iPads, making traditional notebooks and pens obsolete. 103
Teachers and administrators believe that, through the widespread use of technology
in classrooms, students will become more interested and engaged in the material. 104
However, by readily providing students with Internet access, schools risk the
possibility that it will be used for the students’ own personal use during school
hours, rather than just school-related material.105 In Beussink v. Woodland,106
students were able to access a classmate’s offensive homepage from computers in
both the school’s computer lab and library.107 Interestingly, based on the attention
created website depicted his teacher “with her head cut off and blood dripping from her neck,”
and included a donation section to pay for a hitman for the teacher).
100 Braiman, supra note 99, at 471. See also id. at 474 (stating that “[t]he Internet seems to
have given children and adolescents, who lack the judgment and foresight to fully appreciate
the consequences of their words and actions, a forum to say whatever they please, protected
further from those consequences by the perceived, if illusory, safety and absence of risk
provided by the Internet’s abstract distance and anonymity.”).
101

See id. at 472-74.

102

Antrenise Cole, Grant Secures iPads for Attalla Schools, GADSDEN TIMES (Gadsden,
Ala.),
Sept.
22,
2010,
available
at
http://www.gadsdentimes.com/article/20100922/NEWS/100929956/1016/NEWS?p=1&tc=pg
(stating that “[i]t’s our job to make sure students have access to . . . technology and know what
they’re supposed to do with it.”).
103 See, e.g., id.; Jill Russell, iPads for All, THE DAILY NEWS ONLINE (Longview, Wash.),
Sept. 18, 2010, available at http://tdn.com/news/local/article_ecb836ee-c3ae-11df-83af001cc4c03286.html.
104

Cole, supra note 102.

105

See Russell, supra note 103. Certainly students have access to the Internet through
means other than school-provided computers, such as cell phones and personal computers.
However, the technology dilemma for schools arises when Internet-accessible computers are
directly provided to students from the school itself.
106 Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo.
1998).
107

Id. at 1178-79.
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generated by the website, the school’s computer teacher granted several students
permission to access the website from the school’s computers during class time. 108
While Beussink presents a unique situation in which a teacher actively promoted
the use of personal Internet sites during school hours, teachers and administrators are
often unaware that students are using the available technology for personal use. 109
For example, in Layshock, students used the school-provided computers available in
their Spanish classroom and in other parts of the school to access the parody
MySpace page.110 However, administrators only discovered that students were
accessing MySpace from on-campus computers after an investigation in the weeks
following the website’s creation.111 Even after the school learned of students’
MySpace access during school hours, students remained able to access the website,
despite the technology director’s “best efforts” to prevent it. 112
Thus, schools are faced with two competing interests: keeping students up-todate and skilled in technological advancements on one hand and maintaining control
and discipline in their classrooms on the other. Further complicating this issue are
the uncertainties schools face regarding the bounds of their disciplinary authority
over student Internet speech.113 Although public schools are required to “inculcat[e
in their students the] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system,”114 the widespread use of technology is making this
increasingly difficult.115
C. Arguments for the Elimination of Tinker’s “On-Campus” Requirement
Schools’ competing technological interests coupled with student Internet
dependence indicate that Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement serves no functional
purpose within the confines of today’s Internet-dependent schools. As such, this
requirement should be eliminated. There are three prominent reasons behind the
conclusion. First, federal courts across the country have disregarded the “oncampus” requirement based on the nature of Internet speech. 116 Second, students
continue to push the boundaries of decency within the school environment by
108

Id. at 1179.

109

See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2010)
(stating that “[s]chool district administrators were unaware of Justin’s in-school attempts to
access MySpace until their investigation the following week.”).
110 See id. (stating that “ [o]n December 15, Justin used a computer in his Spanish
classroom to access his MySpace profile . . . [and] Justin again attempted to access the profile
from school on December 16 . . . .”).
111

Id.

112

Id.

113

See supra note 10.

114

Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).

See Braiman, supra note 99, at 459 n. 129 (describing a student’s disregard of her
teacher’s requests to put her cell phone away during class time).
115

116 See discussion infra Part III.C.1. See also Papandrea, supra note 87, at 1090 (stating
that the nature of the Internet makes it “generally nowhere and everywhere at the same time . .
. .”).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/11

14

2011]

TWEAKING TINKER

787

harassing, degrading, humiliating, and slandering their teachers, administrators, and
fellow classmates over the Internet.117 Based on this intensified student speech, the
continued application of the “on-campus” requirement encourages students to abuse
their First Amendment rights.118 Third, Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement should be
eliminated because of the dangers posed by its continued use. 119
1. Federal Courts Disregard the “On-Campus” Requirement for Internet-Related
Cases
Federal courts have long understood Tinker as requiring non-protected speech to
originate “on-campus”120—thus anything that happens outside of the reasonable
bounds of the school is protected under the First Amendment. However, the express
language of the Tinker decision allows a school to punish student conduct that
occurs either “in class or out of it,” so long as it substantially disrupts classwork. 121
Thus, although Tinker is understood to require “on-campus” origination, its express
language allows courts to disregard this requirement and schools to extend their
disciplinary authority past the school boundaries.
Only seven years after Tinker was decided, lower federal courts began to relax
the “on-campus” requirement. In Fenton v. Stear,122 a group of high school students
were gathered at a public shopping center away from school on a Sunday
afternoon.123 The group noticed one of their teachers passing by and one student
commented, loud enough for the teacher to hear, “he’s a prick.” 124 The student who
made the comment was suspended for three days. 125 Although the speech occurred
off-campus and outside of regular school hours, the court upheld the suspension
holding that “[i]t is our opinion that when a high school student refers to a high
school teacher in a public place on a Sunday by a lewd and obscene name in such a
loud voice that the teacher and others hear the insult it may be deemed a matter for
discipline in the discretion of school authorities.” 126
Although this case was not decided under the Tinker standard, its holding shows
the beginning of a rift between Tinker and lower court decisions that is especially
117

See supra note 99.

118

See discussion infra Part III.C.2.

119

See discussion infra Part III.C.3.

See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (stating that “[i]n school,
however, [students’] First Amendment rights [are] circumscribed in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.”) (internal quotations omitted); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (allowing student speech restrictions if the
speech occurs “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized
hours.”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13
(1969)).
120

121

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.

122

Fenton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Pa. 1976).

123

Id. at 769.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 772.
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significant for Internet-related cases.127 The Fenton court reasoned that the
protections afforded under the First Amendment do not extend to insulting or
fighting words which “incite an immediate breach of the peace.”128 Additionally,
“[t]o countenance such student conduct even in a public place without imposing
sanctions could lead to devastating consequences in the school.”129 Recently, several
courts presented with Internet-centered cases have recognized the danger feared in
Fenton and, as a result, have relaxed Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement.
In J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,130 an eighth grade student made a
personal website entitled “Teacher Sux” which included insulting and degrading
comments about this teacher as well as a solicitation of $20 from every visitor to
“help pay for the hitman.” 131 The student was subsequently suspended after the
targeted teacher, as well as the school community, discovered the website. 132
Relying on previous federal decisions, the Bethlehem court had little trouble
concluding that “courts have allowed school officials to discipline students for
conduct occurring off of school premises where it is established that the conduct
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process.” 133
Continuing the trend set in Bethlehem, the Wisniewski court gave little weight to
the website’s off-campus creation.134 While Wisniewski argued that his website’s
off-campus origination barred him from punishment, the court instead determined
that its place of origin “does not necessarily insulate him from school discipline.”135
127

Following the Fenton decision, several non-Internet related cases continued the break
from Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement. In Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir.
1995), a group of students created “The Shit List” which “zeroed in on some 140 named
students, each name being followed by one or more lines of crude descriptions of character
and/or behavior.” While the list was neither made nor distributed on school premises, copies
were placed in the school’s garbage can and called to school officials’ attention. Id. at 16.
The court concluded that the off-campus conduct led to the distribution of the list on school
premises, therefore the students’ suspensions were upheld. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 419 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (discussing the Donovan
decision).
128

Fenton, 423 F. Supp. at 771.

129

Id. at 772.

130

Bethlehem, 757 A.2d 412.

131 Id. at 416. Directed at a particular teacher, the website stated, “Fuck you Mrs. Fulmer.
You are a Bitch. You are a Stupid Bitch” and included a “diagram of Mrs. Fulmer with her
head cut off and blood dripping from her neck.” Id.
132 Id. at 417. The district court found that the effect the website had on the school
community “was comparable to the effect . . . [of] the death of a student or staff member
because there was a feeling of helplessness and a plummeting morale.” Id.
133

Id. at 421.

134

Relying in part on the Bethlehem decision, the court in Wisniewski similarly stated that
“[w]e have recognized that off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial
disruption within a school.” Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist.,
494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
135

Id. See also id. at 39 n.3 (stating that since Morse, the Supreme Court has not
determined the circumstances under which a school may discipline students for off-campus
activities).
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Thus, relying on previous decisions, the Wisniewski court concluded that if offcampus conduct creates a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption, the punishment
will be upheld.136
Although some courts are more reserved about expanding Tinker’s authority to
off-campus speech,137 a substantial number of courts have little trouble extending
both Tinker and the school’s authority, so long as a substantial threat of disruption
exists.138 These decisions indicate a growing recognition by courts that Tinker’s “oncampus” requirement is unworkable in an Internet-reliant society.139 Furthermore,
heavy reliance on the on- / off-campus distinction overlooks the thrust of Tinker,
which is not as concerned with the origin of the speech as it is with the disruption it
causes within the school.140 For these reasons, the Tinker standard would be better
adapted to Internet-related cases if its “on-campus” requirement was eliminated.
2. Retention of the “On-Campus” Requirement Leads to Abuse of Students’ First
Amendment Rights
Dissenting from the Tinker majority, Justice Black warned that “[t]urned loose
with lawsuits for damages and injunctions against their teachers . . . it is nothing but
wishful thinking to imagine that young, immature students will not soon believe it is
their right to control the schools . . . .”141 It is easy to see how Justice Black’s fears
136

Id. at 39.

137 See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir.
2010); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002). It
should be noted that much confusion surrounds the application of the “on-campus
requirement.” For example, some courts implicitly determine that the “on-campus”
requirement must be satisfied when the speech originates. See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 259.
Therefore, if the speech does not originate on school grounds, the “on-campus” requirement
has not been satisfied, regardless of the speech eventual entrance “on-campus.” However, in
Thomas ex rel. Tiedeman v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist, 607 F.2d 1043, 1045-46
(2d Cir. 1979), a group of students were suspended for creating and distributing a satirical
newspaper. The Second Circuit deemed their punishments unconstitutional because the
newspaper neither originated nor was distributed on school premises. Id. at 1050. Unlike
Layshock, the Thomas decision states that Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement can be satisfied
either if 1) the speech originates on school grounds, or 2) if the speech eventually crosses onto
school boundaries. Therefore, as these cases indicate, it is unclear whether the speech needs
to simply originate off-campus to be protected or whether it needs to be seen or heard offcampus, as well.
138

See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 298 (3d Cir.
2010); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39; Bethlehem, 757 A.2d at 421.
139 See Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the First
Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into
Cyberspace, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731, 756-58 (2010).
140

See Schiffhauer, supra note 139, at 757; Stephanie Klupinski, Note, Getting Past the
Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech in the Digital Era, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 64344 (2010); see also Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating
that “[t]he Tinker rule is a ‘flexible one,’ and in applying it, ‘we look to the totality of the
relevant facts,’ including not only the plaintiffs’ actions, but ‘all of the circumstances
confronting the school officials’ at the time.”) (citations omitted).
141

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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have become a reality in present-day public schools. With minimal computer
knowledge, students can create humiliating profiles of their principals,142 threaten the
lives of their teachers and fellow classmates, 143 and use sexually graphic language to
describe virtually any member of the school community with whom they have had
contact.144 Moreover, all of this can be accomplished while hiding behind the First
Amendment right of free speech. Because some courts continue to protect this
degrading, humiliating, and threatening speech under the First Amendment, students
are experiencing unprecedented authority in the classroom, believing that anything
they say on the Internet is protected.145 To restore both the educational mission of
public schools as well as the safety felt by teachers and students, it is necessary to
eliminate Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement.
Central to Fraser was the Court’s recognition that “public education must
prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic” by “inculcat[ing] fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.” 146 These
fundamental values must include tolerance of opposing viewpoints, as well as a
respect for the sensibilities of others. 147 To instill these values in its students, public
schools are required to “[balance] unpopular and controversial views . . . against the
society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior.”148
While the role of public schools has not changed since Fraser, a school’s ability
to ensure that its students are furnished with these fundamental values has become
infinitely more difficult with the rise of the Internet. Central to this difficulty is a
school’s ability to discipline its students. As Justice Black remarked, “[s]chool
discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of training our
children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.”149 However,
schoolchildren . . . [who lack] the capacity to appreciate the obligations,
risks, and consequences that [attach to the right of free speech], become
empowered to defy school authorities, say and do whatever they please

142

See, e.g., Layshock, 593 F.3d at 252-53, 254; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291-92, 295.

143

See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34,
35-37 (2d Cir. 2007); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-83
(E.D. Mich. 2002); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416-17 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-80
(E.D. Mo. 1998).
144

See, e.g., Donovan v. Ritchie, 68 F.3d 14, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1995).

145 See Braiman, supra note 99, at 472-74 (claiming that students are presently using the
First Amendment as a “sword rather than as a shield.”).
146

Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (internal quotations omitted).

147

Id.

148

Id.

149 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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while they are in school, and hale teachers and school officials into court
when they do not get their way. 150
Again, it is not difficult to see that Justice Black’s fears have become a reality in
many present-day public schools. In retaliation for being disciplined, students no
longer simply complain to friends about the action taken against them or about the
disciplining teacher or principal. Instead, they charge to the perceived safety and
anonymity of the Internet151 and accuse the disciplinarian of pedophilia,152 illegal
drug use,153 and discuss the disciplinarian’s sexual history. 154 While perhaps such
accusations are not new with the rise of the Internet, the extent to which others can
access them has certainly increased. These accusations not only undermine the
integrity and authority of the school, but they also seriously call into question the
reputation of the singled-out teacher or principal.155
While proponents of the “on-campus” requirement argue that the disciplinary
authority for Internet actions should rest solely with the students’ parents, this
solution cannot realistically inform students of the severity of their actions. Despite
parental discipline, students do not appreciate the consequences and implications of
their actions on the Internet. In Snyder, despite the student’s extensive punishment
from her parents, she proceeded to sue her school, alleging violations of her right of
free speech.156 Thus, despite parental punishment, Snyder did not believe that she
was at fault for the hurtful and offensive allegations she brought against her
principal. Instead, she believed that she was entitled to say whatever she pleased
about her principal and that the school had violated this constitutionally-protected
right.
Furthermore, delegating disciplinary authority solely to parents undermines the
vital ability of a school to punish students for conduct that is not in line with the
school’s mission. “Realistically . . . children could not be educated if school
officials supervising pre-college students were without power to punish one who”
disrupted the educational mission of the school.157 As many student speech cases
150

Braiman, supra note 99, at 458 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 52426). See also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 2010)
(attributing the rise in lawsuits against schools for violations of student First Amendment
rights to “a new culture of students rallying against the administration.”).
151 See Braiman, supra note 99, at 471 (stating that, “[f]or many students, the Internet
provides anonymity and, they believe, impunity.”).
152

See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291.

153

See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir.
2010).
154 See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 291; J.S ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d
412, 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).

See, e.g., Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253 (stating that, after the creation of the “‘degrading’,
‘demeaning’, ‘demoralizing’, and ‘shocking’” website, the principal was “concerned about his
reputation.”).
155

156

See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 293, 294-95.

157 Thomas ex rel. Tiedeman v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist, 607 F.2d 1043,
1049 (2d Cir. 1979).
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indicate, the creation of parody Internet sites have a direct impact on the educational
mission of the school by disrupting class time, undermining the authority of school
administrators, greatly infringing upon the teachers’ sense of safety and well-being,
and causing rumors to spread about particular teachers and principals. 158 Removing
any disciplinary authority from the school simply because the Internet writings did
not occur “on-campus” would drastically undermine the school’s authority.
Consequently, to paraphrase Justice Black, students would then be empowered to
believe that they may say what they please, where they please, and when they
please.159
Critics of eliminating the “on-campus” requirement further argue that, if schools
could extend their disciplinary authority onto the Internet, then virtually no student
expression would be out of the school’s reach. 160 However, eliminating the “oncampus” requirement still ensures that, under Tinker, the Internet speech creates a
substantial disruption or an interference with the rights of others to fall outside the
protections of the First Amendment. 161 This certainly does not include all Internet
speech that directly relates to the students’ school, teachers, principals, or fellow
students,162 but only speech that is deemed substantially disruptive by the school.
Thus, the school’s disciplinary authority takes effect only once the Internet speech
threatens to substantially disrupt either school activities or the rights of others. 163
This ensures that school administrators do not take a “knee-jerk” overreaction to
student expression164 out of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.” 165 On the
158

See, e.g., Layshock, 593 F.3d at 252; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 294; Bethlehem, 757 A.2d at

417.
159

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
160 See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260 (stating that “[i]t would be an unseemly and dangerous
precedent to allow the state in the guise of school authorities to reach into a child’s home and
control his/her actions there to the same extent that they can control that child when he/she
participates in school sponsored activities.”); Schiffhauer, supra note 139, at 760-61 (arguing
that punishing students for Internet speech is too invasive and has the potential to do more
harm to the school community than the Internet speech itself); Papandrea, supra note 87, at
1091-92 (arguing that the elimination of the “on-campus” requirement would “grant schools
virtually unbridled discretion to restrict juvenile speech generally.”).
161 In Snyder, the majority “disagree[d] with our dissenting colleague’s assertion that under
our standard a school district could punish two students ‘for using a vulgar remark to speak
about their teacher at a private party. . . .’ Our opinion, reached by applying Tinker, only
allows school discipline when there is a significant risk of substantial disruption at the school.
[Therefore,] there is no risk that a vulgar comment made outside the school environment will
result in school discipline absent a significant risk of a substantial disruption at the school.”
593 F.3d at 301 n.8.
162 See Papandrea, supra note 87, at 1091-92 (fearing that, because most student expression
centers around their school, virtually any student expression would come to the school’s
attention and, thus, be under its disciplinary control).
163

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.

164

See Schiffhauer, supra note 139, at 761.

165

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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contrary, it allows schools to assess the “special characteristics of the school
environment” and determine whether punishment is warranted for the disruption
caused by the Internet speech.166
Abuse of the First Amendment right of free speech by students may not be a new
phenomenon, but its effects are certainly farther-reaching and more disruptive with
the rise of the Internet. Students’ beliefs that they are entitled to say virtually
whatever they want on the Internet undermines the educational mission of the
school, disrupts school activities and class time, harasses teachers and students, and
contributes to their growing misconception that they control the schools. 167
Retention of Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement reinforces these misconceptions in
students and allows them to hide behind the First Amendment with the belief that the
school has violated their right to say whatever they please. Therefore, Tinker’s “oncampus” requirement should be eliminated to ensure that students do not abuse their
First Amendment rights, thus allowing public schools to once again instill in its
students the fundamental values necessary for entrance into society. 168
3. Retention of Tinker’s “On-Campus” Requirement Threatens the Safety of
Teachers, Students, and Other School Personnel
The incidents of cyber violence and cyberbullying have risen with alarming rates
over the past decade.169 These “[v]iolent incidents in schools . . . deprive students of
their constitutionally protected property right to an education because they divert
students’ attention from their studies [and] create[] an atmosphere of fear and
apprehension while diminishing the school’s educational mission.” 170 Although
courts certainly do not condone threats of violence, they implicitly allow such
conduct to occur by prohibiting discipline simply because the threat originates “offcampus.”
In Mahaffey v. Aldrich,171 a student created a website entitled “Satan’s web page”
which included a weekly mission for other students.172 One week, “Satan’s” mission
instructed the website’s viewers to “[s]tab someone for no reason then set them on
fire throw them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before
everything goes black, spit on their face.”173 The student then advised viewers that
“[k]illing people is wrong don’t do [i]t unless Im [sic] there to watch.” 174 Despite the
166

Id. at 506.

167

Id. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting).

168

See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).

169

See generally Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: Identification,
Prevention,
and
Response,
CYBERBULLYING
RESEARCH
CTR.,
http://www.cyberbullying.us/Cyberbullying_Identification_Prevention_Response_Fact_Sheet.
pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
170 Michael C. Jacobson, Note, Chaos in Public Schools: Federal Courts Yield to Students
While Administrators and Teachers Struggle to Control the Increasingly Violent and
Disorderly Scholastic Environment, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 909, 936 (2006).
171

Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

172

Id. at 781-82.

173

Id. at 782.

174

Id.
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seriousness and dangerous nature of the website, the district court believed that the
website was created within the student’s First Amendment rights. 175 Utilizing a
dangerous line of reasoning, the court downplayed the threats written on the website
and instead saw it as a simply a joke that was created for laughs. 176 Furthermore, the
court gave great weight to the website’s disclaimer, telling viewers, “NOW THAT
YOU’VE READ MY WEB PAGE PLEASE DON’T GO KILLING PEOPLE AND
STUFF THEN BLAMING IT ON ME. OK?”177 Based on these two factors, the
court determined that a reasonable person would interpret the website as a joke
which did not actually intend for anyone to be harmed or killed.178
Perhaps even more disturbing is the court’s utter disregard of previous acts of
violence based on Internet writings. Included on “Satan’s web page” was an
introduction stating, “[t]his site has no purpose. It is here to say what is cool, and
what sucks. For example, Music is cool. School sucks. If you are reading this you
probably know me and Think Im [sic] evil, sick and twisted.” 179 It went on to “list[]
‘people I wish would die,’ ‘people that are cool,’ ‘movies that rock,’ ‘music I hate,’
and ‘music that is cool.’”180 Eerily similar to this website were the writings created
by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the students responsible for the Columbine
Massacre. Harris’ and Klebold’s writings, like Mahaffey’s website, stated, “You
know what I hate? Star Wars fans: get a friggin life, you boring geeks. You know
what I hate? People who mispronounce words . . . . You know what I hate? People
who drive slow in the fast lane, God these people do not know how to drive. You
know what I hate? The WB network!!!!” 181
Critics of eliminating the “on-campus” requirement argue that societal changes
have caused students to express themselves in a violent and crude manner and
courts, who cannot appreciate such changes, overreact to “nonsense or ‘sick
humor.’”182 However, this can hardly be deemed a legitimate reason for retaining
Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement. Although it is admittedly difficult for schools to
predict whether a student’s Internet threats have the potential to be carried out,
schools cannot wait until a threat is actually carried out to consider disciplinary
action to protect the safety of the school community. 183 Adhering to the Mahaffey
line of reasoning would ensure that the school could take no disciplinary action
could until after a particular threat is carried out.
175

Id. at 786.

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Id.
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Id. at 781-82.

180

Id. at 782.

181

Jacobson, supra note 170, at 935 (citation omitted).

182

Schiffhauer, supra note 139, at 759.

183

See Rob Quinn, 3 Teens on Facebook Hit List Killed, NEWSER (Aug. 25, 2010, 1:43
AM), http://www.newser.com/story/98904/3-teens-on-facebook-hit-list-killed.html. Under
facts strikingly similar to many cases mentioned throughout this Note, a hit list was posted on
Facebook, naming 100 men and women who were to be killed if they did not evacuate town.
Id. Police “initially thought [the site] was a joke[;]” however three of the named individuals
were shot and killed. Id.
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Furthermore, threatening Internet speech is undoubtedly seen by many of the
student’s classmates, thus disturbing the aura of safety within the confines of the
school community. Although courts disregard threatening websites as jokes that
could not possibly be taken seriously, 184 the individuals against whom the threats are
made certainly do not interpret the websites as students simply looking for laughs. 185
If schools are to continue protecting the safety and well-being of all school
personnel, Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement cannot be sustained.
“The original idea of schools . . . was that children had not yet reached the point
of experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders.”186
Although this idea has not changed since Tinker was handed down in 1969, retention
of its “on-campus” requirement allows students to out-smart their elders by writing
harassing, degrading, humiliating, and threatening messages on the Internet under
the perceived protection of the First Amendment. Federal courts across the country
are recognizing the counter-intuition of this requirement and allow school
disciplinary action for things said online. 187 “Change has been said to be truly the
law of life but sometimes the old and the tried and true are worth holding.” 188
However, when the tried and true no longer serve a useful purpose in the law, the
only beneficial solution is change, which, in this case, is the elimination of Tinker’s
“on-campus” requirement.
IV. TINKER’S SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION TEST SHOULD BE BETTER DEFINED
In addition to eliminating the “on-campus” requirement, the Court should
provide clarity to Tinker’s “substantial disruption” prong by creating a factors test.
The Tinker standard allows a public school to punish its students so long as the
speech “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others . . . .”189 Although this standard has been applied to countless
cases since its 1969 inception,190 no court has given “substantial disruption” a precise
definition. While most courts uniformly agree that Tinker grants deference to the
school’s finding of a substantial disruption, 191 courts are unsure of what exactly
184 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36
(2d Cir. 2007); Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 786; J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 421 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
185 See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36 (stating that the threatened teacher asked to be removed
from the student’s English class, out of both fear and embarrassment); Bethlehem, 757 A.2d at
416-17 (stating that the threatened teacher received a medical sabbatical leave of absence for
the school year and could not mingle with crowds out of fear that someone was intending to
kill her).
186

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
187

See discussion supra Part III.C.1.

188

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).

189

Id. at 513.

190

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 137.

See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (stating that the “school . . . must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.”) (emphasis added);
191
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constitutes a “substantial disruption.” Therefore, to create a more understandable
and unified standard, courts should adopt a factors test to determine if a “substantial
disruption” has occurred.
Although countless court opinions have utilized the Tinker analysis, no court has
given an exact definition to a “substantial disruption.” It is precisely this absence
that accounted for the conflicting opinions in Snyder and Layshock. In both cases,
students circulated copies of the parodied MySpace profiles and spoke about the
profiles’ contents during class time, requiring administrators and teachers to
repeatedly ask students to refrain from discussing the profiles at school. 192 The
Snyder court was satisfied that such disruptions were “substantial” enough under
Tinker193 while the Layshock court was not.194 Based on the conflicting results of
these almost identical cases, it is clear that a more defined standard is required.
Although there is no precise definition of a “substantial disruption,” the court in
Saxe v. State College Area School District195 stated that, “[t]he primary function of a
public school is to educate its students; [therefore] conduct that substantially
interferes with the mission is, almost by definition, disruptive to the school
environment.”196 However, this circular definition gives courts little assistance in
determining if a student’s First Amendment rights have been violated. Furthermore,
this seems contrary to what the Tinker Court itself implied—that a “substantial
disruption” must have a physical interference in the school.197
Under Justice Fortas’ reasoning in Tinker, a “substantial disruption” occurs
when: 1) the student’s speech interferes with, or is likely to interfere with, the
school’s direct teaching activities; 2) the communication from the teacher to the
students or from the students back to the teacher is in a structured setting; and 3)
there is violence or a threat of violence. 198 However, this definition provides little
more guidance than the attempted definition set out in Saxe. For example, when is a
Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 299 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that, “a school
may meet its burden of showing a substantial disruption through its well-founded belief that
future disruption will occur.” (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008)));
Thomas ex rel. Tiedeman v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050
n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissing an argument that courts, rather than schools, should adopt
student-speech regulations because of the “oft-articulated deference to the discretion of school
officials.”) (citations omitted).
192 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir.
2010); Snyder, 593 F.3d at 293-94.
193

See Snyder, 593 F.3d at 303.

194

See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263.

195

Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).

196

Id. at 217.

See Abby Marie Mollen, Comment, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of
Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1522 (2008) (arguing that “Justice
Black’s statement in dissent that the armbands “did divert students’ minds from their regular
lessons” might suggest that the Tinker Court did not consider nonphysical interference to be
sufficient.”).
197

198 See Mark Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1995).
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teacher involved in “direct teaching activities?” The Snyder court implicitly
determined that breaking up several minutes worth of conversation during
unstructured free time constituted a direct teaching activity. 199 However, this same
activity was not considered a direct teaching activity in Layshock.200
Furthermore, how serious must the threat of violence be to warrant a disruption?
In Bethlehem, the court determined that the solicitation of money from other students
to hire a hit man was a serious threat that constituted a “substantial disruption.” 201
However, in Mahaffey, an arguably more dangerous threat of violence was not
serious enough to be considered a “substantial disruption.” 202 It is clear from these
decisions that the little guidance provided by Tinker has left courts unsure of what
exactly constitutes a “substantial disruption.” Therefore, further clarification is
necessary.
To allow for both the flexibility and subjectiveness required in a public school
setting, the best and most effective way to evaluate a “substantial disruption” is
through a factors test. Under a factors test, courts do not need a precise definition of
“direct teaching activities” or the “educational mission” of the school. Instead,
courts can evaluate the school’s forecast of a substantial disruption through a
specified list of elements. Significant factors should include: 1) the amount of time
disrupted in the classrooms;203 2) the extent to which the Internet speech was
directed at a particular member of the school community, including other students,
teachers, or administrators; 3) the subject matter of the speech, including its level of
vulgarity and obscenity;204 4) the physical, emotional, professional, and personal
consequences experienced by the target of the Internet speech; 5) any relevant
reaction to the speech outside of the school community, including parental concerns
or the necessity of police involvement; 6) the severity of any threat made against a
particular member of the school community; and 7) the extent to which a reasonable
199 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 294, 303 (3d Cir.
2010).
200 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 253, 263 (3d Cir.
2010).
201

See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 416, 422 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000).
202 See Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82, 786 (E.D.
Mich. 2002).
203 This non-exhaustive list can include time spent by teachers quieting students from
talking about the disputed Internet speech during either structured or unstructured class time,
conversations between teachers and students about the disputed Internet speech inside the
classroom, and time spent accessing the disputed Internet speech through school-provided
computers or the students’ own personal computers and cell phones.
204
Although schools cannot punish a student solely out of a “discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint,” Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969), a student’s level of obscenity or vulgarity
should be a relevant factor in determining whether the speech is protected, see Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). It should be noted that the level of obscenity and
vulgarity could remove a particular student Internet speech from a Tinker analysis and place it
instead under Fraser’s authority. However, the exact amount of vulgarity necessary to
warrant a Fraser analysis can best be determined by the courts.
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person would dismiss the Internet speech as a mere joke. Although this list assumes
equal weight to all factors, both schools and courts can afford more weight to certain
elements if the circumstances indicate that such imbalance is necessary.
Opponents of this revised approach can argue that a factors test creates just as
much, if not more, uncertainty than the current standard because it “fails to provide
clear, workable guidance for future cases.” 205 However, the strength of this
argument is limited by two beneficial aspects of factors tests. First, although the
proposed factors test will require courts to define more terms than the previous
“substantial disruption” test, it does not follow that this will create more confusion in
both the courts and schools. Rather, it will free courts from the burden of
determining what exactly constitutes a “substantial disruption” and allow them to
look at a list of factors relevant to determining whether a “substantial disruption” has
occurred. Given the confusion that courts endure in determining the existence of a
“substantial disruption,”206 a factors test will be a beneficial guide, rather than a
cause of greater confusion.
Second, factors tests provide courts with enough flexibility to craft their rulings
to particularized fact patterns.
The “special characteristics of the school
environment,” as recognized by Justice Fortas, indicate that courts cannot effectively
apply a single, broad standard to all schools. 207 Rather, courts must utilize a standard
that allows for both the flexibility necessary in a particular school environment and
consistency required for the faithful application of the law. The most effective way
to craft such a standard is through a factors test.
Because courts have not received sufficient guidance on what constitutes a
“substantial disruption” from either Tinker or Saxe, further clarification is necessary.
To avoid contradictory results, the “substantial disruption” prong would be better
understood and utilized as a factors test. Factor tests ensure that courts: 1) are not left
to decipher the meaning of ambiguous words on their own and thus reach
contradictory conclusions208 and 2) utilize the same criteria to determine whether the
school was justified in punishing the disputed Internet speech. Therefore, Tinker’s
“substantial disruption” prong should look at a list of relevant factors, rather than
one culminating disruption within the school.
V. CONCLUSION
As Justice Black opined, “[c]hange has been said to be truly the law of life . . .
.”209 Therefore, when confronted with an unworkable doctrine, courts must
recognize the doctrine’s limitations and redefine the standard to fit the changing
times. The current Tinker standard for student free speech has created significant
confusion among lower courts, which has allowed some courts to place their
205

See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2269-72 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (creating a list of 40 questions raised by the majority’s newly-created factors test).
206 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010);
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010).
207

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.

208

See Layshock, 593 F.3d at 263; Snyder, 593 F.3d at 303; see also Yudof, supra note
198, at 367-70 (indicating that Justices Fortas and Black—both of whom decided the Tinker
case—had differing opinions about the “mission of the school.”).
209

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting).
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imprimatur on threatening and other dangerous speech. 210 Based on this failing, the
Court should redefine Tinker to make it both more applicable to the Internet era and
more supportive of schools’ educational missions. This redefinition should include
the following two prongs: 1) elimination of Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement and
2) clarification of the “substantial disruption” element as a factors test.
Presently, Tinker requires unprotected student speech to occur within the
reasonable boundaries of the school yard.211 However, the nature of the Internet
does not allow it to be confined to space and time since the Internet is “generally
nowhere and everywhere at the same time . . . .”212 Due to this new technological
reality, allowing Internet speech to remain protected simply because it is not written
at school seems futile. Indeed, in light of this new reality, lower federal courts have
begun to break from Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement.213 Furthermore, continued
use of Tinker’s “on-campus” element encourages students to believe that anything
they say and do on the Internet is protected. This belief has increased as courts
continue to protect the violent and offensive student Internet discourse.214 Therefore,
to restore both the educational mission of public schools and the aura of safety
surrounding those schools, Tinker’s “on-campus” requirement should be eliminated.
Tinker also requires non-protected student speech to have a “substantial
disruption” of class time.215 However, “substantial disruption” has never been given
a precise definition. Therefore, lower courts are left to determine for themselves
whether a disruption is substantial enough under Tinker. It is precisely this lack of
clarity that accounted for the conflicting results found in Layshock and Snyder.
Therefore, to ensure that lower courts utilize the same criteria in student speech
cases, Tinker’s “substantial disruption” prong would be better understood as a
factors test.
Redefining Tinker would restore uniformity in lower court decisions by avoiding
conflicting results on identical facts, 216 as well as inform public schools of their true
disciplinary reach. Implementing these two revisions would ensure that courts adjust
Tinker to the modern Internet era and thus, bring life back into an otherwise
confusing and muddled doctrine.217
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See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 252, 263 (3d Cir.
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